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 Welfare Targeting and Work 
Incentives 
 
Abstract 
Tax and welfare policies must strike a balance between providing income support 
to those in need and maintaining a financial incentive to work. This paper focuses 
mainly on the latter objective, identifying the financial incentive to work as 
measured by the replacement rate – the ratio of out-of-work income to in-work 
income. While a high ratio is positive in terms of the income support function, it 
reduces the financial gain from employment. The analysis shows that high 
replacement rates tend to be found for individuals who receive payments in 
respect of adults or children who are financially dependant on a jobseeker. 
However, most of Ireland’s unemployed individuals are single or do not receive 
additional payments in respect of adults or children. The proportion of non-
workers facing high replacement rates is similar to that in the UK. The Irish Rent 
Supplement scheme is one factor leading to more very high replacement rates 
than the UK’s Housing Benefit. Monitoring the impact of the shift to a new 
Housing Assistance Payment will be important in this context. 
.   
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
A recent IMF report on fiscal policy and economic inequality stressed that “Both 
tax and expenditure policies need to be carefully designed to balance 
distributional and efficiency objectives, including during fiscal consolidation” 
(IMF, 2014). Striking this balance requires information both on the extent to 
which income support objectives are being met, and on the implications of taxes 
and benefits for the financial incentive to work. For advanced economies, the IMF 
report indicates that means-testing, with a gradual phasing out of benefits as 
incomes rise, is one of the options helping to minimise the adverse impact on the 
financial incentive to work. In this paper we explore the financial incentives to 
work associated with the Irish tax and welfare systems – including many means-
tested elements. Our analysis takes account of the great diversity in 
circumstances (wage rates, marital status, number of children, housing tenure) 
among the population by using SWITCH, the ESRI tax benefit model which is 
based on data from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (CSO, 2011). 
 
We focus in particular on the incentive to take up (or remain in) employment – 
often termed the “extensive margin” in labour supply analysis. The most 
commonly used measure of the financial incentive to be employed is the 
replacement rate – the ratio of out-of-work income to in-work income.1  
Decisions on how many hours to work, for those who are in employment – the 
“intensive margin” – are influenced by the marginal effective tax rate. This was 
examined in our paper to last year’s conference (Callan et al., 2013), and is also 
the subject of ongoing work. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The measures, data and methods used are set 
out in Section 2. Section 3 examines the incidence of high replacement rates, 
including some comparisons with the UK, and tests of the sensitivity of the results 
to alternative predictions of wage rates for the unemployed and the inclusion of 
in-work costs. Section 4 identifies the characteristics of individuals and families 
which are associated with high or very high replacement rates. Section 5 then 
identifies the policy features which tend to contribute towards individuals facing 
high replacement rates. Section 6 reviews international evidence on the extent to 
which replacement rates, and some other aspects of welfare systems – such as 
activation requirements – influence labour supply decisions. The main 
conclusions and some issues for further research are drawn together in the final 
section. 
1  Adam and Browne (2013), comparing the replacement rate [RR] with an alternative “participation tax rate” [PTR] state 
that “Arguably, the RR is a better measure of the financial incentive to be in work, while the PTR is a better measure of 
how far the tax and benefit system weakens the financial incentive to be in work”. 
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 2. MEASURING FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO WORK2 
2.1 Replacement rates: Meaning and Measurement 
The replacement rate is the most commonly used single measure of the incentive 
to be in work. It measures the proportion of in-work income which would be 
retained or replaced (e.g., by jobseeker payments) when out of work. For 
example, an individual might find that his or her family income when unemployed 
is €180 per week, but that on taking up a job that disposable income would rise 
to €300 per week. The replacement rate in this situation would be 60 per cent. 
Replacement rates are in widespread use both in empirical studies and in 
theoretical models of the labour market. They are also widely used in policy 
debate, both nationally (e.g., NESC, 2011) and internationally (e.g., OECD, 2014). 
For all these reasons, it is the replacement rate measure which is the focus of the 
current study. 
 
In looking at replacement rates it is essential to be aware of  two different 
perspectives. From one perspective, the replacement rate provides a measure of 
the financial incentive to work – the lower the replacement rate, the greater the 
incentive to work, other things being equal. Looked at from the point of view of 
the income support goal, however, a higher replacement rate  is seen as 
improving the level of support and degree of insurance afforded to those who 
become unemployed. Policy must be designed to strike a balance between these 
perspectives, in a context in which there is considerable variation both in needs 
(related to family size, for example) and in potential wages (which vary in 
response to factors such as productivity, skills and experience rather than needs). 
The need to balance the potential conflicts between the income support and 
work incentive goals means that careful monitoring of both the income support 
and work incentive outcomes is needed. The present paper contributes to this 
task. 
 
How do replacement rates relate to the goal of “making work pay”?   
• A replacement rate of 50 per cent means that moving into work would lead 
to a doubling of net family income. 
• A replacement rate of 67 per cent means that an individual's net income 
would rise by 50 per cent when moving from unemployment or non-
employment to employment.3 
2  Parts of this section draw on the description of measurement methods in Callan et al. (2012). 
3  For example, if in-work income were €300 and out-of-work income €200 per week, then moving into work would raise 
income by €100 or 50 per cent of the out-of-work income. 
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 • A replacement rate of more than 100 per cent or more means that the 
individual would lose net income when moving from unemployment to 
employment. 
 
There are two broad approaches to the use of replacement rates in monitoring 
financial incentives to work. One is based on spreadsheet analysis for a set of 
example households. While useful in identifying some aspects of incentives, the 
fundamental difficulty with this approach is that it cannot arrive at a nationally 
representative picture (See Callan et al., 2012, for further details). The alternative 
approach is to start with a nationally representative survey, and use a tax-benefit 
model to simulate in-work incomes for the unemployed, and out-of-work 
incomes for those who are employed. While the OECD have made extensive use 
of the first approach, OECD (2013) states that “Welfare and tax adjustments 
should be made based on micro-based evidence that identifies particular groups 
where the disincentive to work is high. “For example, such evidence (Callan et al., 
2012) suggests that” ...around 8 per cent of the unemployed face a replacement 
rate of over 100 per cent, often due to the receipt of housing related benefits 
that are available when in unemployment but rarely when in employment.” This 
paper builds on Callan et al. (2012) to provide improved identification of groups 
with high disincentives based on a tax-benefit model analysis of nationally 
representative survey data (the Survey on Income and Living Conditions, CSO’, 
2011). 
 
In this paper we examine the financial work incentives facing single persons 
couples,4 and lone parents, taking account of the ways in which tax and welfare 
entitlements are affected by the number and ages of dependent children. For a 
single person who is unemployed or not at work, we simulate the welfare 
payments received when not in work, and the resulting net income.5 This is 
compared with an estimate of the net income they would obtain if they were 
employed – something which depends on the wage they are likely to be able to 
obtain in the labour market. Potential wages are influenced by such factors as 
educational qualifications and age or experience. For example, other things being 
equal, someone with a university degree is likely to obtain a higher wage than 
someone whose highest qualification is a Junior Certificate – further details of the 
wage estimation procedure used are given in Section 2.2. 
 
4  The small numbers of cohabiting couples in the SILC survey mean that it is not possible to report separately on this 
group; however, they are included in the model.  
5  This includes housing-related payments such as Rent or Mortgage Supplement. It does not include the value of medical 
card or GP services card, but work is now under way on this topic. 
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 We examine the incentives facing both partners in a couple, taking each person in 
turn. When examining incentives facing one spouse, we hold the labour market 
participation of the partner constant. In so doing, we take into account the 
overall impact of the change on family income. A narrow focus on the individual's 
own disposable income6 would fail to take account of the possible impact of an 
individual's taking up employment on the social welfare entitlements and/or 
income tax liabilities of his or her spouse or partner. Adult children are regarded 
as separate decision making units, but the impact of the household means test 
("benefit and privilege") applying to young adults living with their parents is taken 
into account, as are the new, lower rates of payment for Jobseeker's Allowance 
for those aged under 25. 
 
2.2 Estimating Wages for the Unemployed  
For people who are not currently in paid work,7 a key issue is how much they 
could expect to earn if they were employed.8 The broad approach used here is in 
line with empirical studies of labour supply, which use a predicted wage taking 
into account wage-relevant individual characteristics. For example, this is the 
approach used in Adam et al. (2010) and in the Mirrlees Review (Mirrlees et al., 
2011) – now a major landmark in tax policy analysis. This is the concept used in 
our microsimulation approach (following earlier work by Callan et al., 1996) and 
in Adam et al. (2006) and Adam and Browne (2010). The key point is that 
jobseekers vary in the wage that they can reasonably expect to attain in the 
labour market, and that a method which allows for this is more realistic than a 
"one wage fits all" approach.  
 
In earlier work (Callan et al., 2012) used a particular technique – a selection 
corrected regression or Heckman correction – to take account of the fact that 
there might be differences in unmeasured characteristics of unemployed and 
employed populations (over and above age, education etc.) which would affect 
the wages which could be commanded. Here, we use an alternative approach 
which seems better able to capture the key features.9 
 
In this section we summarise the main features of the estimated results: details 
are provided in an Appendix to this paper. Wage equations are estimated 
6  Disposable income is cash income from all sources – including wages and salaries, profits, pensions, interest, dividends 
and welfare payments – net of taxes, levies and social insurance contributions. 
7  This includes those who are unemployed – whether or not they receive any jobseeker payment – and those who 
classify themselves as not in the paid labour market.  
8  The focus here is on the wage which could be expected in the short run. Individual’s decisions regarding employment 
will also be influenced by the likely time path of earnings arising from taking up employment. 
9  We are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions on these issues. 
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 separately for four categories: single women, single men, married women and 
married men. This approach allows not only for gender differences in pay, but 
also for the very widespread finding that there is a “wage premium” attached to 
marriage for men, and, commonly though not universally, a “wage penalty” 
attached to marriage for women. (The sources and interpretation of such premia 
are discussed in Pollmann-Schult, 2011). 
An alternative would be to limit such wage premia/penalties to an impact on the 
constant term in the wage equation. However, a statistical test10 indicates that 
the interaction variables contribute significantly to explaining the variation in 
wages across individuals. Thus, their inclusion in the wage prediction procedure is 
warranted on statistical grounds.  
 
The key variables used to predict hourly wages are age (and its square, to allow 
for a positive but decreasing impact) and five levels of educational qualification 
(none beyond primary is the base case, followed by Junior Certificate or 
equivalent, Leaving Certificate, non-degree third level, and third-level degree or 
higher). The minimum wage for those under 18 years of age, which at €6.06 is 30 
per cent below the general minimum wage, is used as a floor for predicted 
wages.11 Weekly earnings are generated on the basis of a job with a 40 hour 
week – this is the modal value reported by full-time workers in SILC 2010.12  
 
2.3 Unemployment and Wage Scarring 
There is substantial evidence that spells of unemployment, or spells out of the 
labour market, have, on average, a negative impact on the wages which can be 
commanded in the labour market. Here we review some of that evidence, and 
develop an approach to take account of it in predicting wages for those not in 
employment, based on data available in SILC. 
 
Early investigations of the scarring impact of unemployment and wages were 
conducted by Arulampalam (2001) and Gregory and Jukes (2001). Arulampalam 
analysed the British Household Panel Study, and found evidence of a wage 
penalty which varied over time. She estimated that the average initial impact was 
a reduction of 6 per cent in wages, rising to 14 per cent about 3 years after 
returning to work, and then declining to about 11 per cent. Gregory and Jukes 
10 Technically, the test is of the hypothesis that the additional variables do not contribute to explanatory power, and an F-
test value of 1.77 (degrees of freedom (21,2817) is significant at the 5 per cent level. 
11  We allow for the fact that wages cannot be perfectly predicted – an error term, drawn from the normal distribution, is 
added to the predictions to ensure that the "spread" of predicted wages is in line with what is indicated by the 
estimated wage equation.  
12  An analysis of incentives facing those interested in part-time work, or in moving from part-time to full-time work, has 
also been undertaken, and will be reported in subsequent papers. 
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 identified two effects using linked administrative data: an impact from having a 
spell of any length, and an impact from the duration of the spell. A short spell 
could have a 10 per cent impact in the short run, but a long-run penalty of 2 per 
cent. Spells of six months to a year could have long-run impacts of 5 to 10 per 
cent. Gregg and Tominey (2005) analysed the National Cohort Development 
Study, which surveyed the same individuals at ages 16, 23, 33 and 42. They found 
that the “scar” from early unemployment could be of the order of 13 to 21 per 
cent by age 42. But this wage penalty would be lower – close to 10 per cent – if 
the individual managed to avoid repeat exposure to unemployment. 
 
Another approach to estimating the impact of spells out of the labour market 
(whether unemployed or out of the labour force) is to use information on 
individual work histories – which cover the entire period since first leaving 
education. A standard approach in the literature is to include variables for years 
worked and years not worked – along with the square of each of these variables 
to allow for the fact that the influence may not be linear. Typically international 
and Irish results find that there is a positive influence from years worked 
(negative for its square) and a negative coefficient attached to time out of the 
labour market (positive for its square). The most recent Irish data which supports 
this approach came from the Living in Ireland Surveys of 1994-2001. McGuinness 
et al. (2009) used the work history information in the Living in Ireland Surveys to 
find that an additional year out of the labour market or unemployed would, on 
average, reduce wages by between 3 and 4 per cent for women in all years 
examined (1994, 1997 and 2001) and for men in the years 1994 and 1997; 
however, a higher impact was found for men, of close to 6 per cent, in 2001. 
 
Our approach in this paper is to estimate the relationship between wages and 
characteristics (age, education level, marital status, gender) for those who are in 
employment. We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for this step. We then allow 
for a 10 per cent reduction in wages associated with a spell of unemployment or 
a spell out of the labour market. We examine the results of this procedure in 
Table 1, focusing in particular on how well wages predicted on this basis 
represent the actual wage of those who have been unemployed during the past 
year but have returned to work. We examine the impact of alternative reductions 
(5 per cent or 15 per cent) on the distribution of replacement rates in Section 3 
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TABLE 1 Estimating potential wages for the unemployed 
Hourly wage 
band Actual Wage 
Predicted Wage (OLS 
Minus 10 Per Cent) Actual Wage 
Predicted Wage 
(OLS ) 
  
Employees with period of 
Unemployment 
Employees without period of 
unemployment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  % % % % 
Under €10  18 29 12 16 
€10 to €12.50  33 17 15 14 
€12.50 to €15  17 13 17 12 
€15 to €20  12 20 22 22 
Over €20  19 21 34 36 
Total  100 100 100 100 
Source:  CSO SILC 2010 and SWITCH.   
 
Column (1) of Table 1 shows the distribution of wages actually obtained by those 
who had a spell of unemployment during the 12 months preceding the survey 
interview, but who had obtained a job by the time of that interview. It is clear 
that there is a wide spread of hourly wages. Predicted wages for the same 
individuals, using the OLS estimates, reduced by 10 per cent to take account of 
wage scarring, are also shown (Column (2)). These predicted wages substantially 
overestimate the proportion of individuals facing wages below €10 – i.e., 
overstate the incidence of very low pay – but come close to the correct 
proportion facing wages of under €12.50. At the other end of the wage 
distribution, about 1 in 5 of the relevant group (those with unemployment 
experience who have returned to employment) have a predicted wage (OLS 
minus 10 per cent) of more than €20 per hour – in line with what is observed.13 
 
Corresponding patterns for the Heckman predictions are much further from the 
observed data for those who have returned to work from unemployment. These 
patterns suggest that a predicted wage based on OLS, minus 10 per cent to take 
account of wage scarring, come closer to representing the wages facing 
unemployed people than the Heckman approach previously used. Thus, it is the 
13  The predicted wage underestimates the proportion in the €12.50 to €15 and overstates the proportion in the €15 to 
€20 hourly wage band. Predicted wages have about one-third of the group in the €12.50 to €20 band, as against 29 per 
cent for the observed wages. 
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 OLS wage, minus 10 per cent, which will be used in the rest of this paper, unless 
otherwise specified. 
 
For employees without any period of unemployment, actual wages and predicted 
wages – in this case OLS without any reduction, as there has been no 
unemployment – are reported in Columns (3) and (4). These confirm that the 
wage equation estimates broadly capture the key features of the distribution of 
wages, using a rather small number of predictor variables. 
 
2.4 Estimating Unemployment Compensation for Employees  
For those who are in employment, estimating a replacement rate requires a 
simulation of the income they would obtain if they were unemployed. The main 
issue to be decided here is whether the replacement rate should be calculated on 
the basis of an entitlement to Jobseeker's Benefit (JB), or to Jobseeker's 
Allowance (JA). The qualification conditions for Jobseeker's Benefit mean that not 
all of those in employment would qualify for it. Those who did qualify would 
receive it for a maximum of nine months, then transferring to the JA rate if they 
remained unemployed and satisfied the search for work criterion. In many 
instances, the payments received on JA and JB would be the same; but where 
differences occur, the rate on JB would be higher, meaning that some of those 
who are employed would have a higher replacement rate for up to 9 months, if 
the calculation were done in terms of an entitlement to JB. Two considerations 
point towards the use of the JA rate. First, if the in-work/out-of-work decision is 
thought of as a long-term one, then the JA rate would be the more relevant one. 
Second, much of the focus in recent debate (IMF, 2012; OECD, 2011) has been on 
long-term replacement rates. For these reasons, we focus here on calculations 
which are based on the JA rate.  
 
It should be noted that only the replacement rates of those who are currently 
employed would be affected by an alternative treatment seeking to apply JB rates 
instead of JA rates. It would require a significant input of time to implement this 
in the SWITCH model. But we can, even at this stage, be clear on what the nature 
of the outcome would be. Changing this assumption would have no impact on 
replacement rates for those who are currently unemployed or not in the paid 
labour market. Shifting to allow JB where individuals qualify for it would make 
replacement rates for some employees somewhat higher – but the individuals 
concerned would still be in employment. So the JA assumption may lead to some 
understatement of the incidence of high replacement rates for employees. 
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 2.5 Data and the Microsimulation Model 
The underlying data are from the CSO’s Survey on Income and Living Conditions 
2010. We focus here on the working age population, including also dependent 
children. The data are adjusted for growth (or decline) in average employee and 
self-employed incomes, and for changes in numbers in employment and 
unemployed, so as to represent the 2014 situation. Weighting factors have been 
estimated (using the CALMAR program, widely used by Central Statistics Offices 
and by EUROSTAT) to ensure good representation of the income tax base, and to 
improve an already very good representation of the social welfare client 
population. The adjustment methods are described in Keane et al. (2014). 
 
We include some results for employees, and for persons who are classified with a 
labour force status of “home duties”. However, our main focus is on those who 
are  
1. Unemployed; 
2. in receipt of Jobseeker’s Benefit or Jobseeker’s Assistance;  
3. and not engaged in paid employment. 
 
The reason for focusing on the unemployed is straightforward: this is a group 
which is, by definition, seeking paid employment, so that the financial incentive 
issue is particularly relevant. Those who are not receiving a Jobseeker payment 
are typically facing a stronger incentive to take up employment than those who 
do receive a payment. Thus, in identifying high replacement rates it is helpful to 
focus on those who are in receipt of payment. The third condition – that the 
individual should not be engaged in part-time or casual-employment – arises 
from the fact that such individuals are in a position in which they “mix” benefit 
income and wages. The key issue for them is not so much the replacement rate, 
as the marginal effective tax rate on further earnings. This issue is being 
investigated separately. 
 
Estimates from the SILC data suggest that close to 224,000 individuals match 
these criteria (unemployed, receiving a Jobseeker payment, not in paid work). 
This is substantially lower than the widely quoted headline number from the Live 
Register, currently close to 390,000. The difference between the two is explained 
by the following facts:  
• The Live Register includes almost 80,000 individuals who are engaged in 
casual or part-time work, for whom marginal effective tax rates on 
additional earnings are a more appropriate  measure of incentives than a 
replacement  rate. 
10 
 • About 35,000 individuals are on the Live Register because they are 
“claiming for credits” or otherwise not applying for payment. 
• The LR also includes all those who claim a payment – but a substantial 
number of those claims do not succeed. 
 
When these factors are taken into account, it seems that the SILC-based estimate 
covers about 90 per cent of the relevant population 
 
3. DISTRIBUTION OF REPLACEMENT RATES  
We look first at the overall distribution of high replacement rates for those who 
are unemployed on JA/JB, employees, and those engaged in “home duties”. Table 
2 and several others which follow, may be read as follows: 28.2 per cent of the 
unemployed have a replacement rate of more than 70 per cent; and 21.4 per cent 
have a replacement rate of more than 80 per cent.14 
 
A first point to note, therefore, is that more than 7 out of 10 unemployed 
individuals have a replacement rate of less than 70 per cent. These individuals 
would see their incomes rise by at least 43 per cent if they were to obtain a job, 
at a wage corresponding to their qualifications. The potential impact of lower 
wage levels on these results is explored in Section 4. 
 
TABLE 2 Distribution of Replacement Rates, Ireland 2014 
Replacement 
Rate Category  
Unemployed 
on JA/JB Employees 
Home 
Duties 
 % % % 
>70  28.2 20.6 40.5 
>80  21.4 12.8 20.9 
>90  17.2 8.7 7.9 
>100  13.0 5.8 3.1 
Estimated sub-
population: 223,800 1,446,800 575,900 
Source: SWITCH.  
  
14  Note, therefore, that the percentages do not add to 100, either by column or by row. 
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 The “risk” of facing a high replacement rate (over 70 per cent) is greatest for 
those in home duties, next highest for the unemployed, and lowest for 
employees. The risk of facing very high replacement rates (over 90 per cent or 
100 per cent) is highest for the unemployed. Given the relative sizes of these 
groups, however (1,450,000 employees as against 224,000 unemployed) most of 
those who are facing high or very high replacement rates are in fact in 
employment. For example, of those facing very high replacement rates (90 per 
cent or more) about 125,000 are employees (split evenly between full-time and 
part-time) while about 38,000 are unemployed. 
 
If we are to understand the likely impact of very high replacement rates on those 
who are unemployed, we must also consider the situation of employees facing 
high replacement rates. Callan et al. (2012) point to some reasons why such 
individuals might choose to stay in employment, despite the fact that they could 
be financially better off if unemployed and claiming a jobseeker’s payment: 
1. Replacement rates measure the financial gain from employment in static 
terms; but staying in work tends to lead to higher wages in future, so there 
are also dynamic gains which are not taken into account here or in other 
work on replacement rates.15 
2. Individuals may choose to work in such circumstances for reasons such as 
self-respect, providing an example to their children, or the non-financial 
rewards from working life. 
 
On the latter point, Gallie (2013) notes that “Many economists have been of the 
view that work is a disutility and consequently unemployment is likely to 
undermine the work ethic as people become habituated to a life of greater 
leisure. But a contrary argument is that unemployment will tend to reinforce 
employment commitment because people will become aware of benefits of 
employment which they previously took for granted – for instance the time 
structure it gives to their day, their status, and their ability to interact with other 
people on a regular basis”. Collectively, such items give a non-financial value to 
work. Empirically, Steiber (2013) examines “non-financial employment 
commitment”, which captures the value individuals attribute to the non-financial 
aspects of work. She finds, in a wide range of European countries, that the non-
financial employment commitment of the unemployed is no less than that of 
employees, and sometimes significantly more – particularly in high 
unemployment countries. 
 
15  Individuals may also take into account the build up of social insurance entitlements or pension rights. 
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 Table 3 illustrates the sharp differences between replacement rates facing full-
time and part-time employees. Part-time workers, with  lower incomes because 
of their lower hours,16 are about 3 times more likely to face a high replacement 
rate (70 per cent plus) and about twice as likely to face a very high replacement 
rate.17 
 
TABLE 3 Distribution of Replacement Rates for Full-time and Part-time Workers, Ireland 2014 
 
 
All 
Employees 
Full-time 
Employees 
Part-time 
Employees 
 
% % % 
>70 20.6 12.2 40.7 
>80 12.8 8.5 23.3 
>90 8.7 6.3 14.4 
>100 5.8 4.1 9.7 
N 1,446,800 1,020,000 426,800 
 
How do the overall results compare with recent findings for the UK? In order to 
undertake this comparison we must shift focus from the unemployed to those 
who are not at work – including those engaged in “home duties” as well as the 
unemployed. This is because figures for the UK are available for workers and non-
workers, but not currently for the unemployed separately.18 Table 4 shows the 
results for non-workers in our analysis of Ireland for 2014,19 and for a UK analysis 
of the 2009-10 situation. Recently published results for the UK (Adam and 
Browne, 2013) do not allow a precise comparison, but suggest that changes in 
respect of these comparative figures from the earlier analysis are relatively small.  
 
The proportion of non-workers facing high replacement rates (over 70 per cent 
and over 80 per cent) is very similar for the UK and for Ireland. However, the 
proportion facing very high replacement rates (over 90 or 100 per cent) is higher 
in Ireland. Callan et al. (2012) point to the structure of the Rent Supplement 
scheme as playing a major role in this outcome, and further results on this issue 
will be given in Section 5. These are based on nationally representative data for 
both countries, and on tax-benefit models which have been extensively tested. 
They take into account a key contrast: that housing benefits are received by a 
16  There may also be an association with lower hourly wage rates, adjusting for characteristics – this has been found in 
the UK, but evidence for Ireland is more mixed. 
17  Replacement rates for part-time workers are calculated on the basis of their actual hours of work. Part-time workers 
who are also in receipt of benefit are excluded from these calculations: the key issue here is the marginal effective tax 
rate on additional earnings, which is the subject of a separate study for the Advisory Group on Tax and Social Welfare. 
18  The “non-worker” population in the UK is currently somewhat broader than that included in the Irish analysis; work is 
ongoing to extend the analysis to make it more comparable, but the present results are the best comparison that can 
currently be made. 
19  The proportions facing high replacement rates are not directly comparable with those in Callan et al. (2012), as they 
are based on different wage prediction approaches – see Section 2. . 
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 high proportion of the UK unemployed, and Rent Supplement by a low proportion 
of the Irish unemployed. These results suggest that a focus on the extent of very 
high replacement rates may be productive – UK experience indicates that the 
incidence of such rates can be lowered. Both IMF (2012) and OECD (2013) 
highlight the highest replacement rates –mostly associated with Rent Supplement 
– as requiring particular attention. Empirical evidence is quite limited as to 
whether responsiveness is likely to be greater for those with the highest 
replacement rates, or elsewhere in the replacement rate distribution. But the 
comparison with the UK does suggest that the incidence of the highest 
replacement rate can be lowered, and this would fit with a broader “make work 
pay” agenda. Thus in our analysis we maintain a focus on high and very high 
replacement rates.  
 
TABLE 4 Distribution of Replacement Rates for Non-Workers, Ireland and UK 
Replacement Rate 
Category 
Ireland, 2014 UK, 2009-10 
 % % 
>70 37.3 37.2 
>80 20.4 20.0 
>90 8.9 5.0 
>100 4.3 2.2 
Source:  SWITCH.   
 
3.1 Sensitivity Tests: Wage Scarring and In-Work Costs 
Results so far have been based on a wage scarring effect of 10 per cent (a 10 per 
cent reduction on the OLS estimate of the wage). How much difference does it 
make if predicted wages were higher or lower than this? Here we explore the 
impact of reductions of 5 per cent and 15 per cent in estimated wages for the 
unemployed to span the scale of the impact found in empirical work. Table 5 
shows that a 5 per cent reduction in wages would give rise to a reduction in the 
proportions with high and very high replacement rates of at most between 1½  
and 2½ percentage points.  A 15 per cent scarring effect would have a somewhat 
greater impact, with the proportions having replacement rates above 70  per cent 
close to 3 percentage points higher; while at the 100 per cent cut-off, the 
incidence would rise by about 1½ percentage points. 
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 TABLE 5  Replacement Rate Distributions with Alternative Wage Predictions for Unemployed JA/JB 
Recipients, Ireland 2014 
 OLS OLS 
Minus 5% 
OLS minus 
10% 
OLS minus 
15% 
Replacement Rate 
Category 
% % % % 
>70 25.7 27.1 28.2 31.0 
>80 19.2 20.7 21.4 22.8 
>90 15.8 16.0 17.2 17.6 
>100 10.8 11.5 13.0 14.7 
Source:  SWITCH.   
 
A further sensitivity test is reported in Table 6, which takes an income measure 
net of childcare costs and travel to work costs, as explained in Callan et al. (2012). 
There is a small rise in the incidence of high replacement rates for the 
unemployed (e.g., from 27 per cent to 29 per cent). This reflects the fact that 
most unemployed people do not have children. Results for employees do change, 
with the proportion having high replacement rates rising by 8 percentage points. 
A key point to remember here is that these individuals are in employment, 
notwithstanding the balance of immediate financial incentives. Even if the 
balance is unfavourable in the short term, remaining in the labour market to 
attain higher wages can make sense;20 expected reductions in childcare costs as 
children move into the school-going years may also play a role. 
 
TABLE 6  Distribution of Replacement  Rates including In-Work Costs, Ireland 2014 
Replacement 
Rate Category  
Unemployed on JA/JB Employees 
  (%) In-work Costs 
(%) 
(%) In-work 
Costs (%) 
>70  28.2 29.3 20.6 26.9 
>80  21.4 24.7 12.8 15.7 
>90  17.2 19.5 8.7 10.4 
>100  13.0 14.9 5.8 7.2 
Source:  SWITCH.   
20 In some jobs pay may rise automatically with job tenure through increments; in others, pay may rise as enhanced 
experience and productivity are recognised.  
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 4. PROFILING REPLACEMENT RATES 
Which groups are more likely to have high replacement rates? Here we look at a 
series of characteristics of individuals and families to identify what contributes to 
a higher risk of facing a high replacement rate. In the next section we identify the 
aspects of policy which contribute towards high replacement rates. 
 
Table 7 presents results on the distribution of replacement rates for the 
unemployed group, for those who do and do not have children. There is a very 
sharp distinction between these groups, with a low risk for those without children 
(more than 150,000 individuals) and a very high risk for those who do have 
children (some 68,000 cases). About 60 per cent of the unemployed group who 
have children have a replacement rate above 70 per cent – this means some 
43,000 individuals. Close to one-third of the “with children” group of unemployed 
face replacement rates of more than 100 per cent – this translates into some 
22,000 of the overall unemployed population.  
 
TABLE 7 Recipients of Jobseekers Benefit/Assistance With and Without Children, Ireland 2014 
Replacement Rate 
Category  
With 
Children 
Without 
Children 
With 
Children 
Without 
Children 
 % % Numbers of individuals 
>70%  64 13 43,300  19,900 
>80%  51 8 34,800 13,000 
>90%  40 7 27,100 11,300 
>100%  32 5 21,700 7,400 
Source:  SWITCH. 
   
 
What difference do work-related costs such as childcare and travel to work make 
to this picture? Including such costs, on the basis described earlier, would lead to 
an increase in the numbers facing high replacement rates (over 70 per cent) from  
43,000 to just under 45,000. For those facing the highest replacement rates, the 
increase would be greater, from about 22,000 to just over 25,000. Given the size 
of childcare costs, this result may seem surprising. A key factor is that many of 
those facing high replacement rates are in receipt of a welfare payment in 
respect of a qualified adult – meaning that that adult is likely to be outside the 
labour market. In this situation, the spouse or partner is therefore very often 
available to undertake childcare, so that purchasing of childcare does not arise. 
 
Next we consider to what extent high replacement rates are linked to wage 
levels. Table 8 shows results for unemployed people grouped into four equal 
16 
 groups, based on a ranking of their wages from the lowest wage levels (Quartile 1 
– close to the minimum wage) to the highest (Quartile 4). The risk of facing a high 
or very high replacement rate (over 70 per cent or over 90 per cent) is highest for 
the low wage group, and lowest for the high wage group. 
 
TABLE 8 Distribution of Replacement Rates by Expected Hourly Earnings, Ireland 2014 
 Replacement 
Rate Category  
Lowest 
Quartile 
(<€8.70) 
Quartile 2 
(<€13.16) 
Quartile 3 
(<€18) 
Top 
Quartile 
(>€18) 
 % % % % 
>70  38.4 32.8 25.8 16.1 
>80  31.4 26.6 18.7 9.0 
>90  28.5 20.7 12.4 7.4 
>100  23.8 11.4 11.2 6.0 
Source:  SWITCH.   
 
EU indicators have contributed to a focus on the incidence of “jobless 
households”: SILC data suggest that this is particularly high in Ireland (Watson et 
al., 2012). Joblessness, in this context, is not simply to do with unemployment. A 
jobless household is one in which less than one-fifth of the time of working-age 
adults is spent in work.21 Thus, single person households in which one individual 
is ill or disabled, or couples with one partner ill/disabled and the other in a caring 
role, would also be defined as jobless. Here, however, we focus on whether or 
not unemployed individuals are in jobless households, and on the incentives they 
face compared with unemployed individuals who are in “non-jobless” 
households. 
 
Table 9 shows a strong contrast between unemployed individuals in jobless 
households and in non-jobless households. Unemployed individuals in jobless 
households are more than 2½ times more likely to face a high replacement rate 
(over 70 per cent) and 3½ times more likely to face a very high replacement rate 
(over  90 per cent). 
 
 
21  Watson et al. (2012) use the term “jobless households” to refer to households where less than one-fifth of the 
available time of working age adults was spent in employment or self-employment during the previous year – this is 
what the EU term “very low work intensity” (VLWI). As the VLWI measure  relates to amounts of work carried out in the 
previous year, this implies that the individual is in long-term unemployment or non-employment; however the 
converse is not true as individuals may be long-term unemployed without being in a workless household.  
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 TABLE 9 Replacement rates facing unemployed in Jobless households, Ireland 2014 
Replacement Rate 
Category  
Jobless HHs Non-Jobless 
HHs 
 2014 
 % % 
>70  39.6 16.5 
>80  30.1 12.1 
>90  24.7 9.1 
>100  19.9 5.7 
N of individuals  110,300 111,600 
Source:  SWITCH.   
 
Why are high/very high replacement rates more common for recipients of 
Jobseeker payments in jobless households?  One part of the explanation is that 
the very structure of the means tests and income tests in the social welfare 
system is designed to focus greater payments on those who have lowest incomes. 
For example, an individual who is married to another unemployed person, or to 
someone engaged in home duties, may receive the maximum rate of Jobseeker’s 
Benefit or Assistance, along with increases in respect of a qualified adult and 
qualified children. An individual married to an employed individual, on the other 
hand, will typically receive a lower payment which does not include additions in 
respect of an adult partner or children – and for Jobseeker’s Assistance, the 
amount of the personal payment may also be reduced.  
 
A further issue meriting additional investigation is the extent to which these 
higher replacement rates influence decisions. One possibility is that unemployed 
persons may respond to the incentives faced by reducing job search intensity 
and/or rejecting job offers which do not provide a sufficient margin over and 
above the income available from welfare. On the other hand, even if there is no 
behavioural response, the structure of the social welfare system ensures that a 
significant gap will be seen between the replacement rates faced by Jobseeker 
recipients in jobless and non-jobless households. The key issue here is the extent 
of behavioural responses. Section 6 reviews the available evidence on the issue of 
behavioural response to the welfare systems – including replacement rates, and 
measures such as activation or controls. Of necessity, this review draws largely on 
the international literature. 
 
The final aspect examined in this section is the distribution of replacement rates 
facing lone parents who are not in employment. About a third of lone parents not 
18 
 in employment face high replacement rates – somewhat more than for the 
unemployed. But the situation is reversed when it comes to very high 
replacement rates, which are faced by fewer lone parents than unemployed. A 
key feature here is that the means test in the One-Parent Family Payment has 
been more favourable to the combination of work and welfare income than the 
means test under the Jobseeker’s Assistance scheme. 
TABLE 10 Distribution of Replacement Rates for Lone Parents not in Employment, 2014 
Replacement Rate Category  % of Lone Parents 
>70  33.5 
>80  17.7 
>90  6.2 
>100  0.9 
N of cases  46,352 
Source:  SWITCH.   
 
As of 2011, the OPFP scheme allowed for a disregard of €147 per week before 
any reduction in benefit, and then withdrew benefit on the basis of a 50 per cent 
taper rate (i.e., withdrawing 50 cent of benefit for every additional €1 of earnings 
over and above the disregard).  The disregard is, however, on a downward path. 
It is currently (2014) set at €90 per week, but is set to fall in steps to €60 in 2016 – 
the same level as the disregard in the Jobseeker’s Assistance scheme. A full 
assessment of the impact of the recent and prospective changes in the One-
Parent Family Scheme is outside the scope of the present paper. However, 
careful monitoring of the incentives facing this group is warranted, given the 
significant shift in policy, the fact that childcare costs are especially relevant for 
this group, and international evidence that the labour supply of lone parents 
tends to be more responsive than that of other groups.22 
 
5. WHICH ASPECTS OF POLICY CONTRIBUTE MOST TO HIGH 
REPLACEMENT RATES? 
In this section we try to identify which aspects of policy contribute most to the 
incidence of high or very high replacement rates. It must be stressed that this is a 
technical exercise, aimed at improving the diagnosis of problem areas, rather 
than a prescription or set of policy recommendations. We simply isolate different 
aspects of the welfare system to see the extent to which they contribute to the 
prevalence of high replacement rates. 
22 The survey by Meghir and Phillips (2010) reports  “a strong consensus in the literature that the participation elasticity 
for lone mothers is among the highest of all demographic groups”. 
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Table 11 below first repeats the basic distribution of replacement rates for the 
unemployed in 2014. Subsequent columns then examine three equal-valued 
reductions in welfare payments focused on:  
a) personal rates of payment; 
b) reduction of the increase for a qualified child (IQC, formerly known  as 
Child Dependant Additions); 
c) reduction in the Increase for a Qualified Adult (IQA, formerly known as 
Qualified Adult Addition or Adult Dependant Addition).  
 
Again, it must be stressed that these are not proposals for policy changes – they 
are simply a technical device to identify the contribution each of these elements 
makes to the extent of high replacement rates. The changes are scaled so that 
the cost is approximately the same in each case. We find that the cost of child 
dependant additions (IQCs) is similar to the savings which would arise from a 30 
per cent reduction in personal rates of payment, or a 45 per cent reduction in the 
Increase for a Qualified Adult (IQA). 
 
TABLE 11 Impact of Alternative Equal-Valued Reductions in Jobseeker Payments on Replacement Rates 
RR 
Category 
2014 30% Reduction 
in JA/JB 
Personal Rate 
2014 
(No Child 
Increase) 
2014 
(Increase for a 
Qualified Adult 
reduced by 45%) 
>70 28.2 24.2 25.2 23.9 
>80 21.4 19.5 18.7 18.0 
>90 17.2 15.3 13.4 11.6 
>100 13.0 10.1 9.8 7.9 
Source:  SWITCH.   
 
 
Table 11 shows that a 30 per cent reduction in the personal rate of Jobseeker 
payments would have quite a limited impact on the extent of high replacement 
rates – a reduction of 2 to 3 percentage points in most cases. This is not 
surprising, when one recalls that the unemployed population is largely single and 
without children, with many young and not receiving the full adult rate of 
payment. Thus, a reduction in the personal rate of payment would tend to reduce 
the payment in respect of many people who had low or moderate replacement 
rates.  
 
A system without child dependant additions would have a broadly similar impact 
(2 to 3 point reduction) but with a greater impact on the highest replacement 
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 rates (5 percentage point reduction on replacement rates above 100 per cent). 
There are, however, stronger impacts from a reduction in IQA payments, with 
reductions in the risk of high or very high replacement rates of between 5 and 7 
percentage points. 
 
The counterpart to these results is, of course, that the income supports – 
whether through personal rates, IQAs or IQCs – play a role in the prevention of 
poverty. Table 12 shows how these equal valued reductions in welfare spending 
would affect commonly used measures of income poverty. The “at risk of 
poverty” measures are based on poverty lines at 60 per cent of median income, 
and are widely used in EU statistics. The head count ratio simply identifies the 
proportion of individuals in households with incomes below these poverty cut-
offs. While widely used, the limitations of the head count measure are well 
known and it is often complemented by a “poverty gap” measure which takes 
account of the depth of poverty – how far below the income cut off the incomes 
of poor people are. 
 
TABLE 12  Impact of Alternative Equal-Valued Reductions in Jobseeker Payments on the “at risk of poverty” 
Measure and Poverty Gap 
“At risk of 
poverty” 
indicator  
30% Reduction 
in JA/JB 
Personal Rate 
2014 
(No Child 
Increase) 
2014 
(Increase for a 
Qualified Adult 
reduced by 45%) 
 % increase in poverty measure 
Head count, All 3.7 5.2 1.3 
Poverty gap, All 13.1 18.5 9.5 
Head count, 
Children 
-1.1 9.6 -0.1 
Poverty gap, 
Children 
9.1 33.4 8.6 
 
The reductions in welfare spending have a limited impact on the head count of 
poverty – the greatest impact is from the abolition of IQCs on child poverty, 
which leads to a rise of 10 per cent. But there are much more substantial impacts 
on the poverty gap measure: reductions in personal rates lead to an increase in 
the poverty gap of 13 per cent, and elimination of IQCs to a rise of 19 per cent. 
This reflects the fact that a major part of the impact of these measures is on 
individuals and families who are already below the poverty line income. The 
impact of reductions in IQAs on the poverty gap and head count measure is more 
limited. These calculations are on a static basis, which does not take account of 
potential changes in labour supply or other behaviour.  
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 Rent Supplement has already been identified23 as a component of the system 
which contributes to high replacement rates. “The highest replacement rates 
affect those also receiving housing benefits, resulting in unemployment and 
inactivity traps that lower exit rates from unemployment, making it especially 
important to reform the structure of social payments in this area.” (IMF, 2012). 
One of the key conditions governing eligibility for Rent Supplement is that the 
claimant must not be working more than 30 hours per week. Here again we seek 
to isolate the impact of this component by comparing results of the current 
system with a system without Rent Supplement. Once again, this is a technical 
device to isolate the impact rather than a policy proposal. Table 13 shows the 
results, with a reduction of 6 to 7 percentage points in the incidence at each 
replacement rate cut off. 
 
TABLE 13 Impact of Rent Supplement on Replacement Rate Distribution, Ireland 2014 
Replacement Rate 
Category  
2014 2014 –No Rent or 
Mortgage Supplement 
 % % 
>70  28.2 22.6 
>80  21.4 16.0 
>90  17.2 11.0 
>100  13.0 6.9 
Source:  SWITCH.   
 
 
Proposals for a Housing Assistance Payment, which would provide housing-
related support in a more incentive-friendly fashion, are already being piloted. 
Research on incentive-related aspects of the design is also under way in a 
separate project. 
 
23  Callan et al. (2007); Callan et al. (2012). 
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6. BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSES TO REPLACEMENT RATES 
The size of unemployment benefits is often viewed as being an important 
determinant in unemployed peoples’ decision to work or remain unemployed. 
Howell and Rehm (2009) provide a  review of micro studies that have examined 
the impact of unemployment payments on unemployment duration.24 We draw 
on this survey and a number of individual studies in attempting to assess the 
evidence on the extent of behavioural responses to high replacement rates. 
 
Early studies on this issue included Lancaster and Nickell (1980) and Katz and 
Meyer (1990). They concluded that there was a strong association between 
benefit size and unemployment duration. However, the robustness of the 
relationship between benefits and unemployment duration, particularly the 
magnitude of the impact, was questioned by some during the 1990s (e.g., 
Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991; Holmlund, 1998). Nevertheless, in more recent 
times researchers have been able to exploit natural experiment-like policy 
changes in unemployment compensation in their analyses and have found a 
positive benefit effect on unemployment duration (e.g., Card and Levine, 2000; 
and Lalive and Zweimuller, 2004), with some researchers finding larger positive 
benefit effects for workers that are more loosely attached to the labour market 
(e.g., Cockx and Ries, 2004; Lalive, 2007; and van Ours and Vodopivec, 2008).   
 
In summarising the findings from these studies, Howell and Rehm (2009) 
conclude that while recent micro research has found a positive association 
between unemployment benefits and duration, the magnitude of the impact is 
quite small. For example, accounting for policy endogeneity, Lalive and 
Zweimuller (2004) examined a major policy change introduced in certain regions 
in Austria which extended unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to a maximum 
of 209 weeks for older workers (aged 50 and over). This was found to be 
associated with an increase in unemployment duration of approximately 9 weeks. 
On this basis, a 30 day extension of unemployment benefits would lead to an 
increase in unemployment duration of 1.5 days. In a companion paper Lalive et 
al. (2006) find, using the same dataset, that an increase in the replacement rate 
of 6 percentage points is associated with an increase in unemployment duration 
of 0.38 weeks. Howell and Rehm (2009) believe that the modest results that have 
been found support the view that workers place a positive value on having a job 
over and above its benefit in terms of earning an income - a finding reinforced by 
the literature surveyed by Gallie (2013).  
24  Some micro research has also examined the impact of unemployment benefits on post-unemployment outcomes, such 
as earnings, job quality, employment duration, etc. (e.g., Card et al., 2007; and Lalive, 2007). 
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In Ireland, research on this topic has been limited by the lack of suitable data i.e., 
data which is gathered for unemployed individuals and their households over a 
sustained period. Layte and Callan (2001) used data from the Living in Ireland 
panel study (1994-1998 waves) to analyse the impact of replacement rates on 
unemployment duration. They summarise their results as showing a significant 
impact of replacement rates on duration, but one which is very small by 
international standards. In addition, it is confined to those in receipt of 
Unemployment Benefit and is not identifiable for those in receipt of 
Unemployment Assistance. (They note that a similar finding – greater evidence of 
incentive effects among the short-term unemployed – is common 
internationally.) There is evidence, however, that exits from unemployment 
tended to increase as entitlement to UB came close to exhaustion (then at 15 
months – the time limit is now 9 months). 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Replacement rates (the ratio of out-of-work to in-work income) are widely used 
in economic studies and in policy debate to assess the financial incentive to work. 
This simple measure of the balance between income in-work and out-of-work 
provides a useful summary of the incentive to take up (or remain in) employment 
as against being unemployed or outside the labour force. The findings are based 
on a nationally representative sample – the CSO’s Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions – and on SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, which incorporates the 
effects of current tax and welfare policies. Thus the results given here provide the 
most comprehensive picture available of the pattern of incentives faced by real 
households. 
 
For those who are not in employment, the proportions facing high replacement 
rates (70 per cent or more) are very similar in the UK and in Ireland. However, 
substantially more of the Irish non-workers face a very high replacement rate 
(over 90p per cent). The Irish results take account of the fact that the potential 
wages of unemployed people are subject to a “scarring” effect, leading to lower 
wages in future.  The impact of including in-work costs on replacement rates is 
quite limited for those who are unemployed –  largely because most of the 
unemployed are childless. Of those who are unemployed and married with 
children, many have  have a partner who is in a position to undertake the 
necessary childcare. Childcare costs have a greater impact on the  proportion of 
those in employment facing high replacement rates; but this means that these 
individuals are in employment, despite facing a high replacement rate. 
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 Risk factors for high replacement rates include the receipt of payments for 
qualified adults and/or children, low wages, and/or being in a “jobless 
household”.  The constrast between jobless and non-jobless households arises 
because of the targeted nature of income support – less support is given where 
there are other sources of income, and as a result, the impact of withdrawal of 
support is less severe. The policy factors contributing most strongly to the 
incidence of high replacement rates were identified by “policy experiments”, 
which are not to be thought of as recommendations. Reductions in personal rates 
of payment for Jobseeker’s schemes would have quite a limited impact on 
replacement rates, reflecting the fact that many of those on Jobseeker schemes 
are single, and facing replacement rates which are low or moderate.The key 
factors contributing to high replacement rates are Rent Supplement – which will 
be partially replaced by the new Housing Assistance Payment – and the Increase 
for a Qualified Adult.  
Policy changes to address incentive issues would also need to be evaluated 
against the goals of income support and poverty prevention. For example, cuts 
which are focused on the increases for qualified children (child dependant 
payments) would have a stronger impact on overall poverty and on child poverty 
than cuts of the same aggregate amount in the increase for qualified adults 
(formerly adult dependant addition).  Alternative lines of inquiry would include 
the design of in-work benefits, which would seek to improve incentives while 
maintaining the anti-poverty effect of income supports, and strengthening of 
activation/work search requirements associated with unemployment 
compensation.25 Andersen and Svarer (2014) show in a job-search model how, for 
given benefit levels, activation requirements could be used to improve the 
incentive structure. Empirically, this finding ties in with the fact that Scandinavian 
systems tend to involve both high unemployment benefits and strong activation 
requirements. 
 
The extent of behavioural response to replacement rate incentives remains a key 
issue. This has been an active area of research in the international literature. A 
recent survey (Howell and Rehm, 2009) points to the fact that several studies 
have found significant evidence of behavioural response, but that the magnitude 
of such responses is often rather small. An Irish study on similar lines reaches the 
same conclusion. (Layte and Callan, 2001).  One factor which contributes to such 
results is that decisions are not based simply on the balance of immediate 
financial advantage. Lifetime earnings can be scarred by an unemployment spell, 
and taking up employment can lead to increased earnings over time.  
 
25 This would be particularly relevant for those whose earnings potential is low. 
25 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adam, S. and J. Browne, 2010. "Redistribution, Work Incentives and Thirty Years 
of UK Tax and Benefit Reform", Institute for Fiscal Studies Working Paper 
10/24. 
Adam, S. and J. Browne, 2013. “Do the UK Government’s welfare reforms make 
work pay?”, IFS Working Paper W13/26. 
Adam, S., M. Brewer and A. Shephard, 2006. "Financial Work Incentives in Britain: 
Comparisons Over Time and Between Family Types", Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, Working Paper WP06/20. 
Andersen, T.M. and M. Svarer, 2014. "The Role of Workfare in Striking a Balance 
between Incentives and Insurance in the Labour Market," Economica, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 81(321), pp. 86-116, 
01. 
Arulampalam, W, 2001. “Is Unemployment Really Scarring? Effects of 
Unemployment Experiences on Wages” Economic Journal, Royal Economic 
Society, vol. 111(475), pages F585-606, November. 
 Atkinson, A.B. and J. Micklewright, 1991. “Unemployment Compensation and 
Labor Market Transitions: A Critical Review”, Journal of Economic Literature, 
Vol. 29, No. 4 (Dec. 1991), pp. 1679-1727. 
Blundell, R., 2011. "Tax Policy Reform: The Role of Empirical Evidence", Journal of 
the European Economic Association,  Vol. 10, No. 1, pp 43-77. 
Brewer, M., E. Saez and A. Shephard, 2010. "Means-testing and Tax Rates on 
Earnings" in Institute for Fiscal Studies (ed.) Dimensions of Tax Design, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Callan, T., B. Nolan, C. O'Donoghue, 1996. "What Has Happened to Replacement 
Rates?", The Economic & Social Review, Vol. 27, No. 5, October 1996, pp. 
439-456. 
Callan, T., J.R. Walsh and K. Coleman, 2007. Work Incentives, Poverty and Welfare 
in Ireland, Policy Research Series No. 60, Dublin: The Economic and Social 
Research Institute. 
Callan, T, N. Crilly, C. Keane, J.R. Walsh and Á. Ní Shúilleabháin, 2011. “Tax, 
Welfare and Work Incentives”, Budget Perspectives 2012, Research Series 
No. 28, Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute. 
Callan, T., C. Keane, M. Savage, J.R. Walsh, K. Timoney, 2012. “Work Incentives: 
New Evidence for Ireland” in T. Callan (ed.) Budget Perspectives 2013, Dublin: 
The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
Callan, T., C. Keane, M. Savage and J.R. Walsh,. 2013. "Taxes on Income: Ireland in 
Comparative Perspective", Budget Perspectives 2014, Dublin: The Economic 
and Social Research Institute. 
Card, D. and P.B. Levine, (2000). “Extended Benefits and the Duration of UI Spells: 
Evidence from the New Jersey Extended Benefit Program”, Journal of Public 
Economics, Vol. 78, pp. 107-38. 
Cockx, B. L.W. and J. Ries, 2004. “The Exhaustion of Unemployment Benefits in 
Belgium: Does it Enhance the Probability of Employment?”, Institute for the 
Study of Labor IZA Discussion Paper No. 1177. 
26 
 CSO, 2011. Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) 2010, Dublin: Stationery 
Office. 
Department of Social Protection, 2010. A Policy and Value for Money Review of 
Child Income Support, November 2010. www.welfare.ie/EN/Policy/ 
CorporatePublications/Finance/exp_rev/Documents/CISReviewFinal.pdf 
Department of Social Protection, 2012. Statistical Information on Social Welfare 
Services, www.welfare.ie 
Gallie, D.  (ed.) 2013. Economic Crisis, Quality of Work, and Social Integration 
The European Experience, Oxford.: Oxford University Press,  
Gregg, P. and Tominey, E. 2005. “The wage scar from male youth unemployment” 
Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 487-509, August. 
Gregory, M. and Jukes, R. 2001. “Unemployment and Subsequent Earnings: 
Estimating Scarring among British Men 1984-94” Economic Journal, Royal 
Economic Society, vol. 111(475), pages F607-25, November. 
Holmlund,B. 1998. “Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice”, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 113-141. 
Howell, D.R. and M. Rehm, 2009. “Unemployment compensation and high 
European unemployment: a reassessment with new benefit indicators”, 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 60-93. 
International Monetary Fund, 2012. Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV 
Consultation, Washington: IMF. 
IMF, 2014. “Fiscal Policy and Economic Inequality”, IMF policy paper available 
online at : http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/012314.pdf 
Katz, L. F. and B.D. Meyer, 1990. “The Impact of the Potential Duration of 
Unemployment Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment”, Journal of 
Public Economics, Vol. 41, pp. 45-72. 
Keane, C., T. Callan, M. Savage, J.R. Walsh, K. Timoney, 2014. “Identifying Policy 
Impacts in the Crisis: Microsimulation Evidence on Tax and Welfare”, Journal of 
the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, Vol. XLII, 2012-13, pp. 1-14. 
Kluve, J. 2010. “The effectiveness of European active labor market programs,” 
Labour Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp. 904-918, December. 
Lalive, R., 2007. “Unemployment Benefits, Unemployment Duration, and Post-
Unemployment Jobs: A Regression Discontinuity Approach”, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 2, pp. 108-112. 
Lalive, R. and J. Zweimuller, 2004. “Benefit entitlement and unemployment 
duration: The role of policy endogeneity”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 
88, pp. 2587-2616. 
Lalive, R., J. C. van Ours and J. Zweimuller, 2006. "How Changes in Financial 
Incentives Affect the Duration of Unemployment," Review of Economic 
Studies, 2006, Vol. 73, No. 4, pp. 1009-1038. 
Lancaster, T., and S. Nickell, 1980. “The Analysis of Re-employment Probabilities 
for the Unemployed”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, “A” Vol. 143, 
No. 2, pp. 141-165. 
Layte, R. and T. Callan, 2001. “Unemployment Welfare Benefits and the Financial 
Incentive to Work,” The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 103-129. 
McGuinness, S., McGinnity, F. and O'Connell, P. J., 2009, “Changing Returns to 
Education During a Boom? The Case of Ireland”. LABOUR, 23: 197–221.  
27 
 Meghir, C. and D. Phillips, 2010. "Labour Supply and Taxes", in J. Mirrlees, S. 
Adam, T. Besley, R. Blundell, S. Bond, R. Chote, M. Gammie, P. Johnson, G. 
Myles and J. Poterba (eds.), Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review, 
Oxford University Press for Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Mirrlees, J. S. Adam, T. Besley, R. Blundell, S. Bond, R. Chote, M. Gammie, P. 
Johnson, G. Myles and J. Poterba, 2011. Tax by Design: The Mirrlees Review, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
National Economic and Social Council (NESC), 2011. Supports and Services for 
Unemployed Jobseekers: Challenges and Opportunities in a Time of 
Recession, Dublin: National Economic and Social Development Office. 
OECD, 2011. OECD Economic Surveys: Ireland 2011 Paris: OECD Publishing. 
OECD, 2013. OECD Economic Surveys: Ireland 2013 Paris: OECD Publishing.  
OECD, 2014. Benefits and Wages: OECD Indicators, www.oecd.org/els/social/ 
workincentives. 
Petrongolo, B. 2009. “The long-term effects of job search requirements: Evidence 
from the UK JSA reform,” Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 93, Nos 
11-12, pp. 1234-1253, December.  
Pina, A., 2011. “Structural Reforms to Reduce Unemployment and Restore 
Competitiveness in Ireland”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 
No. 910, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg0szws6t6c-en 
Pollmann-Schult, M., 2011. “Marriage and Earnings: Why Do Married Men Earn 
More than Single Men?” European Sociological Review, Vol. 27, No.2, pp.147-
163.  
Røed, K. And L. Westlie, 2007. “Unemployment Insurance in Welfare States: Soft 
Constraints and Mild Sanctions,”. Journal of the European Economic 
Association. 
Steiber, N. 2013. ”Economic Downturn and Work Motivation” in Gallie, D. ed. 
Economic Crisis, Quality of Work, and Social Integration The European 
Experience, Oxford.: Oxford University Press,  
van Ours, J. C., and M. Vodopivec, 2008. “Does Reducing Unemployment 
Insurance Generosity Reduce Job Match Quality?”, Journal of Public 
Economics, Vol. 92, Nos 3-4, pp. 684-695. 
Watson, D., Maitre, B. And Whelan, C., 2012.  Work and Poverty in Ireland: An 
Analysis of CSO Survey on Income and Living Conditions 2004-2010,  
ESRI and Social Inclusion Division of Department of Social Protection. 
28 
